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CRIMINAL LAW-SUSPICIOUS PERSON ORDINANCES-
DUE PROCESS STANDARDS
Columbus v. Thompson, 25 Ohio St. 26, 266 N.E. 2d 571 (1971).
URING THE EARLY morning hours of December 20, 1968, an employee
of the control tower of Port Columbus Airport noticed defendant
and another person rolling tires through the parking lot at said airport.
The men placed the tires beside an automobile which they then entered.
They were in the car when the police, who had been called by the control
tower employee, arrived. The officer questioned both men who answered
that they were looking for a lost set of keys. Both men denied rolling the
tires which were still beside the automobile. The officer was unable to
discover any evidence of missing tires in the parking lot and there were
no subsequent reports of tires having been stolen in said parking lot
that morning. The police arrested both men and charged them with
a violation of the Columbus, Ohio, suspicious person ordinance.1 The
arresting officer filed an affidavit stating that defendant:
did unlawfully loiter and wander about a public place, to wit: Port
Columbus parking lot.... Sect. 2387.02 G without being able to give
a reasonable and satisfactory account of himself, contrary to the
ordinance of said city.2
At trial in the Municipal Court defendant moved to dismiss the
officer's affidavit on the ground that the Columbus suspicious person
ordinance was unconstitutional. This motion was denied and the defendant
was convicted, sentenced to 60 days in the workhouse and fined $100.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Municipal Court and
upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance. However, that Court
certified the cause to the Ohio Supreme Court because of a conflict with
another Ohio decision.3 Contrary to the holdings in a number of earlier
1 Columbus, Ohio, General Offenses Code §2387.02 (1959):
It shall be unlawful for any suspicious person to be in this City. The following
shall be deemed suspicious persons: ... (g) Any person who wanders about
the streets or other public ways or who is found abroad at late or unusual
hours in the night without any visible or lawful business and who does not give
satisfactory account of himself.
2 City of Columbus v. Thompson, 25 Ohio St. 2d 26, 27, 266 N.E. 2d 571, 571 (1971).
3 City of Cleveland v. Forrest, 39 Ohio Op. 2d 203, 223 N.E. 2d 661 (Cleveland Mun.
Ct., 1967).
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Ohio cases considering similar ordinances, 4 the court found the ordinance
to be vague and indefinite, and therefore an unconstitutional denial of
due process required under the Fourteenth Amendment.5
One of the earlier and more frequently cited cases construing such
an ordinance in Ohio is Morgan v. Nolte6 which dealt with an ordinance
based on RS §2108, the predecessor of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §715.55 (B).
In upholding the conviction of a "known thief" under the municipal
ordinance the court said:
It is a mistake to suppose that offenses must be confined to specific
acts of commission or omission. A general course of conduct or
mode of life which is prejudicial to the public welfare may likewise
be prohibited and punished as an offense. 7
A similar result was reached in City of Columbus v. McCrory8 wherein
an earlier Columbus suspicious person ordinance was found not to be a
violation of due process.9 In Welch v. City of Cleveland10 the court
emphasized that since the fundamental purpose of a suspicious person
ordinance was crime prevention, the municipality, in its exercise of the
4 Cases cited notes 6, 8, 10, 12 infra. These cases upholding suspicious person
ordinances such as the one under consideration are partially due to the existence of a
section in the Ohio Revised Code authorizing municipal corporations to punish
vagrants and suspicious persons. The Code section is Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §715.55:
Any municipal corporation may provide for: (B) The punishment of any
vagrant, common street beggar, common prostitute, habitual disturber of thepeace, known pickpocket, gambler, burglar, thief, watch stuffer, ball gameplayer, a person who practices any trick, game, or device with intent to
swindle, a person who abuses his family, and any suspicious person who
cannot give a reasonable account of himself.
Many municipalities enacted ordinances consistent with this provision. The following
are only a very few examples of these ordinances: Akron, Ohio, General Offenses
Code §1179.01 (1960 as revised 1968); Cleveland, Ohio, Codified Ordinances §13.0935;
Cincinnati, Ohio, Code of Ordinances §901-L5, §901-L6 (1956); Columbus, Ohio,
General Offenses Code §2387.02 (1959); Dayton, Ohio, Code of General Ordinances
§929 (1954).
5 Supra, note 2.
6 37 Ohio St. 23 (1881).
7 Id. at 25.
8 38 Ohio L. Abs. 142, 49 N.E. 2d 583 (Ct. App., 1942). The significant portions of
the ordinance read:
Section 1183. Suspicious persons... (2) or found wandering about the streets
either by day or by night, without being able to give a reasonable and
satisfactory account of himself.
9 Contra, City of Seattle v. Drew, 70 Wash. 2d 405, 410, 423 P. 2d 522, 525 (1967)
n. 6, where the Washington Court said that the Ohio Court in McCrory upheld the
ordinance without any "underlying rationale" for their decision and that said decision
is "an unfortunate deviation from the recognized limits of permissible municipal
regulation."
1097 Ohio St. 311, 120 N.E. 206 (1917).
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police power under the Ohio Constitution, may enact such an ordinance."
The court, however, did not discuss the question of whether the language
of the ordinance was vague or indefinite.
In the case of City of South Euclid v. Paladino,12 the municipal
court, basing its decision on Welch, found that the South Euclid suspicious
person ordinance had a reasonable relationship to the public safety and
welfare and was therefore a constitutional exercise of the police power by
the municipality. The court emphasized that the defendants had failed to
allege or prove that the ordinance expressly contravened any specific pro-
vision of the Ohio Constitution, but rather had made a general attack on
the constitutionality of the entire ordinance. In the absence of proof of any
clear conflict, the court refused to find the ordinance unconstitutional. It
should be noted that the defendants did not raise and the court
did not consider the question of whether the language of the ordinance
might be vague or indefinite. All of the above cases upholding suspicious
person ordinances place great emphasis upon the benefit to the public
of such provisions.
Even if there is great benefit to the general public from such
ordinances, they must not infringe upon the constitutional rights of the
individuals involved. Some courts therefore have required that there be
additional conditions necessary to constitute the offense and avoid
vagueness.13 This is a small step toward protection of the rights of the
individuals by narrowing the applicability of the ordinance.
Greater efforts to achieve individual protection, not necessarily at the
expense of public welfare, have resulted in a number of decisions which
have found the typical suspicious person ordinance invalid. In Cleveland
v. Forrest14 the defendant was charged under the Cleveland suspicious
persons ordinance15 which prohibits persons from "wandering about the
streets, either by day or by night, without being able to give a reasonable
and satisfactory account of themselves." The court found that the
ordinance under which the defendant was charged was a violation of
11Welch v. City of Cleveland, 97 Ohio St. 311, 120 N.E. 206 (1917). In Welch at
316, 120 N.E. at 207 the court concluded:
We regard that public policy most salutory and most humane which seeks to
prevent crime from occurring rather than to punish it after it has occurred.
This seems to be the fundamental purpose of the grant of power underlying the
statute and the ordinance. We find no constitution] or statutory objection to
the ordinance, and the same is therefore valid.
12 30 Ohio Op. 2d 560, 204 N.E. 2d 265 (South Euclid Mun. Ct., 1964).
13 Ricks v. United States, 228 A. 2d 316, 322 (D.C. Ct. App., 1967). Being a known
thief or a narcotics violator were additional conditions in the offense considered by
the court in upholding the ordinance.
14 Supra, note 3.
15 Supra, note 4. A woman standing near the defendant at a bus stop was taken to
the police station after she had conversed with the occupants of a passing car. After
boarding the bus, the defendant was arrested and charged with a violation of the
Cleveland suspicious person ordinance.
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the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Furthermore, the
court emphasized that requiring a person to "satisfactorily account for his
presence upon the public streets offends the right to silence guaranteed by
the Fifth Amendment" and charging him with a crime without probable
cause is a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Although this decision
precipitated certification of Thompson16 to the Supreme Court of Ohio,
there are probably more compelling grounds for invalidation of such
ordinances by reason of their vagueness. In Thompson, the court consid-
ered persuasive City of Columbus v. DeLong17 which involved the
vagueness of the term "wandering" as used in Sec. 2343.18 of
the Ordinances of City of Columbus. While the ordinance in DeLong
was applicable to prostitutes only, the court in Thompson concluded
that the term "wandering about as it applies here to all citizens, is
also too indefinite, restrictive and liberty depriving to satisfy due
process requirements."1 8 The Supreme Court of Washington, considering
the Seattle suspicious person ordinance said:
The impermissible vagueness is in these particular phrases: (I)
"wandering or loitering abroad" (2) "abroad under other suspicious
circumstances" and (3) "a satisfactory account of himself."1 9
Vagueness in an ordinance or statute precludes the reasonable
individual from determining whether his conduct is proscribed, 20 and
creates the possibility of abuse by public officials in the enforcement of
the ordinance. In Coates v. City of Cincinnatze the United States Supreme
Court reviewed the convictions under the Cincinnati loitering ordinance'
16 Supra, note 2.
17 173 Ohio St 81, 180 N.E. 2d 158 (1962). The ordinance provided:
No prostitute, lewd woman, or any female inmate of a disorderly house shall
be found wandering about the streets or frequenting restaurants or bars where
alcoholic beverages are sold or consumed, or in hotels or other places of public
resort, or shall be employed as an entertainer or waitress in any such place
in this city.
In DeLong at 82, 180 N.E. 2d at 159 the court concluded, "[T]he ordinance in
controversy, as worded, is too indefinite, restrictive and liberty depriving to constitute
a valid exercise of the police power."
18 Supra, note 2 at 31, 266 N.E. 2d at 574.
19 Supra, note 9 at 409, 423 P. 2d at 524.
20 In Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 325 Mass. 519, 521, 91 N.E. 2d 666, 667, (1950),
the court stated:
The vice of the ordinance lies in its failure to prescribe any standard capable
of intelligent human evaluation to enable one chargeable with its violation to
discover those conditions which convert conduct which is prima jacie lawful
into that which is criminal.
2191 S. Ct. 1686 (1971).
22 Cincinnati, Ohio, Code of Ordinances §901-L6 (1956):
It shall be unlawful for three or more persons to assemble, except at a public
meeting of citizens, on any of the sidewalks, street corners, vacant lots, or
mouths of alleys, and then conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons
passing by, or occupants of adjacent buildings.
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of a student demonstrator and other individuals picketing in a labor
dispute. The Supreme Court of Ohio which earlier had affirmed the
conviction in considering the ordinance found that:
The word "annoying" is a widely used and well understood word; it
is not necessary to guess its meaning... the standard of conduct
which it [the ordinance] specifies is not dependent upon each
complainant's sensitivity.23
In the course of its discussion of this finding by the Ohio Court, the
United States Supreme Court stated:
But the court did not indicate upon whose sensitivity a violation does
depend-the sensitivity of the judge or jury, the sensitivity of the
arresting officer, or the sensitivity of a hypothetical reasonable man.24
The court in holding that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague
concluded:
The ordinance is vague not in the sense that it requires a person to
conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative
standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is
specified at all.23
Therefore, an ordinance to avoid unconstitutional vagueness must specify
some ascertainable standard of conduct which it purports to prohibit so
an individual can refrain from that conduct in order to avoid criminal
liability or at least be able to make a choice as to whether or not to
engage in that prohibited conduct.
A vague ordinance or statute affords too much leeway for abuse of
discretion by law enforcement officials and the courts. The Coates decision
is also relevant 'to a consideration of the ordinance in the Thompson case
with respect to the possibility of abuse of discretion in its application.
Ordinances similar in wording to those involved in Coates and Thompson
could contribute to erroneous judgment by an arresting officer due to the
lack of sufficient standards for ascertaining whether one's conduct is
criminal or not. In Coates, the court expressed its disapproval of such
police discretion when it said:
The city is free to prevent people from blocking sidewalks, obstruct-
ing traffic, littering streets, committing assaults, or engaging in
countless other forms of antisocial conduct. It can do so through the
enactment and enforcement of ordinances directed with reasonable
2321 Ohio St. 2d 66, 69, 225 N.E. 2d 247, 249 (1970).
24 Supra, note 21 at 1688.
2 5 Supra, note 21. In addition to the consideration of the violation of the due process
standard of vagueness, the court held that the ordinance also violated the First
Amendment right of peaceful assembly.
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specificity toward the conduct to be prohibited .... It cannot consti-
tutionally do so through the enactment and enforcement of an
ordinance whose violation may entirely depend upon whether or
not a policeman is annoyed.2
6
The possibility of this abuse has been expressly recognized in a number
of other decisions. In Alegata v. Commonwealth27 the Massachusetts
Supreme Court observed:
No statutory guidance is supplied or even hinted at as to what
constitutes a satisfactory account. This leaves too much discretion
in the hands of the police and the courts.2 8
In an earlier case where the United States Supreme Court struck down
a suspicious person ordinance for vagueness it was stated:
... [P]art of this ordinance says that a person may stand on a
public sidewalk in Birmingham only at the whim of any police officer
of that city. The constitutional vice of such a provision needs no
demonstration.29
Discretion stemming from vague ordinances is particularly sus-
ceptible to abuse, whether intentional or unintentional, with respect to
certain underprivileged groups.
The persons arrested on "suspicion" are not the sons of bankers,
industrialists, lawyers, or other professional people. They, like the
people accused of vagrancy, come from other strata of society, or
from minority groups who are not sufficiently vocal to protect
themselves, and who do not have the prestige to prevent an easy
laying-on of hands by the police."
2 6 Supra, note 21 at 1688.
27 353 Mass. 287, 231 N.E. 2d 201 (1967). The court considered Mass. Gen. Law
Ann. ch. 41 §98 which provides:
During the night time... [police officersi may examine all persons abroad
whom they have reason to suspect of unlawful design, and may demand of
them their business abroad and whither they are going.... Persons so suspected
who do not give a satisfactory account of themselves ... may be arrested
by the police....
28 Id. at 291, 231 N.E. 2d at 205.
29 Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965). The ordinance
construed by the court was §1142 of the General Code of Birmingham of 1944 which
provided:
It shall be unlawful for any person or any number of persons to stand, loiter,
or walk upon any street or sidewalk in the city as to obstruct free passage
over, on or along said street or sidewalk. It shall also be unlawful for anyperson to stand or loiter upon any street or sidewalk of the city after having
been requested by any police officer to move on.
30 Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 Yale L.J. 1, 13 (1960).
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The defendant in Palmer v. City of Euclid3 was this type of individual.
In Palmer, the United States Supreme Court found that the Euclid
suspicious person ordinance was unconstitutionally vague as applied to
the defendant. Unfortunately, the court failed to examine the language
of the Euclid ordinance and consider whether or not the ordinance was
"unconstitutionally vague on its face," an omission Mr. Justice Stewart
noted in his concurring opinion:
While I agree with the court that Euclid's "suspicious person
ordinance" is unconstitutional as applied to the appellant, I would
go further and hold that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague
on its face.3 2
In Coates the court did consider the language of the Cincinnati
loitering ordinance which prohibited annoying assemblies and found it
to be unconstitutionally vague on its face. However, this consideration
may be distinguished from the Palmer case because of the infringement
upon the First Amendment right of assembly involved under the
loitering ordinance in Coates.
In the absence of circumstances involving First Amendment rights,
we are left without guidelines as to the conduct which may be made
criminal by local suspicious person ordinances. Because of this lack of
adequate standards, a case by case determination of criminal conduct
under the various ordinances is necessary. In Thompson the defendant's
conduct was questionable and the court found the ordinance unconstitu-
tionally vague. We can only hope that this decision has a sufficient
impact upon law enforcement officials and local courts to minimize
the injury resulting from vagueness.
JOEL R. CAMPBELL
3191 S. Ct. 1563 (1971). Palmer was arrested and charged with a violation of the
Euclid suspicious person ordinance which makes criminal the act of:
any person who wanders about the streets or other public ways or who is
found abroad at late or unusual hours in the night without any visible or
lawful business and who does not give satisfactory account of himself.
Id. at 1564. He had dropped a female companion off at an apartment building in
suburban Euclid and was waiting in his automobile on the street when the police
approached him. The police found Palmer's explanation for his activities to be
unsatisfactory and therefore made the arrest.
32 Id. at 1564.
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